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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND TIMELINESS

The final Judgment of Conviction, Suspended Sentence and Order of Probation
was entered by the District Court on May 24, 2017. The Defendant filed a Notice of
Appeal on July 5, 2017. The First Amended Notice of Appeal was filed August 2, 2017.
The Defendant filed a Second Amended Notice of Appeal on January 23, 2018. The
Appellant's Brief and this appeal are timely filed.
The Defendant is appealing a Judgment of Conviction, Suspended Sentence and
Order of Probation entered by the District Court in Ada County, Idaho.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant's conviction stems from cash, checks, and money orders that went
missing from Boise County during the years of 2013 and 2014. During this time, and for
years prior, Appellant Rana Klingner was employed by the Boise County Clerk's Office.
The County later accused the Appellant of utilizing her position as a County employee to
commit thefts accumulating an amount in excess of one thousand dollars ($1,000.00).
In 2014, Boise County conducted a yearly audit, at which time the County
discovered that money was unaccounted for. Thereafter, several Boise County
employees, including Appellant Ms. Klingner, were put on temporary leave during an
investigation. The Appellant later resigned from her position with Boise County.
The evidence at trial showed that during the years of 2013 and 2014 various
payments collected by several Boise County departments was missing. The Appellant
was employed by the Boise County Clerk's Office during these years and, as part of her
job duties, she was responsible for collecting all money and transmittals delivered to the
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Clerk's Office by the County departments. Transmittals were used by the County
essentially as receipts created by the individual departments for all money taken in over a
given period of time. Each department had its own system for creating transmittals and
transferring the funds to the Clerk's Office. Some departments created regular
transmittals while others created them irregularly, if ever. Similarly, some departments
transferred the money on a regular basis; others waited weeks between transfers.
When money was transferred to the Clerk's Office, it was left with a Boise
County Clerk employee, in one of the two large county walk-in vaults, or unattended on
the Appellant's desk. The Appellant was then responsible for creating an Auditor's
Certificate - an electronic record documenting the money received by the county and
what department it came from. These "ACs" were the first record in the county's
financial systems showing the existence of any money received by the county. If an AC
was not created, there was no record that the county ever received the money except in
the accounting records of the individual departments.
Records admitted into evidence show that money being received by the various
departments was never recorded on an Auditor's Certificate by the County Clerk's
Office. This means that the unaccounted for money went missing sometime after the
department received the money but before an Auditor's Certificate was created.
Appellant was the most obvious individual who had access to all county funds being
transferred into the Clerk's Office; her job made her the bottleneck where the money
from all the departments converged. In most instances, she signed for custody of the
money while it was being processed. As the Appellant even admitted - she was the
logical person to question first. However, due to the complete lack of proper accounting
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and security procedures, even the lead investigator on the case, testified that other
individuals could have been responsible for the theft.
Prior to being processed, Boise County Clerk employees stored the money and
transmittals in the vaults or in Appellant's desk. Sometimes days, weeks, and, on one
occasion, months, passed before the Appellant created an Auditor's Certificate. Further,
the accounting procedures were as such that, if the transmittal was stolen with the money,
if a copy of the transmittal was not left with the Clerk's Office, or if a transmittal was
never produced, there would be no way for employees of the Clerk's Office to know that
the money was missing. Similarly, if the money and transmittals were misplaced or lost,
there would be no record that it had every existed.
Nearly every witness testified about the alarming lack of security. Almost anyone
could access County offices, the contents of the vaults, and the contents of Ms.
Klingner's desk. One vault used to store money and important documents did not lock
and was never closed while the other vault was rarely locked and the combination was
known to all employees in the Clerk's Office: In fact the combination was written all
around the office, including on a sticky-note on the door of the vault itself. The Appellant
voiced her concern with the security numerous times: as early as 2012, Appellant
requested that a locking drawer be installed on her desk to alleviate some of these issues,
however, the drawer was not installed until spring, 2014.
Further, while the testimony established that access to the Appellant's work area
was "controlled" during work hours (limited to only Boise County employees) due to its
location in the office, other areas of the office were much easier to access. The front
room, containing the locking vault, was often visited by members of the public and
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delivery personnel. Most or all Boise County employees had access to the full office
during work and non-work hours. The testimony from several witnesses gave examples
of employees other that Ms. Klingner accessing the office, unmonitored and after hours.
An unknown number of keys to the office have been produced over time and it is
additionally unknown where these keys are located or who has possession of them.
Several past and current employees testified that they are or were in possession of office
keys. They also testified that spare keys to all county buildings were easily accessible to
any county employee. As the lead Idaho State Police investigator in this case testified, the
accounting procedures were insufficient, the security procedures were deficient: "the
clerk's office was literally rife for theft to occur." Tr., 2.13 .17-2.21.17, p.664, L. 5-10.
After she produced an Auditor's Certificate, the Appellant was responsible for
transferring the corresponding money with a printed copy of the certificate to the County
Treasurer's Office. The County Treasurer's Office deposited the money into the Boise
County bank accounts and sent a printed Auditor's Certificate back to the department of
origin. Each department was to ensure the certificate matched the amounts received and
recorded in the transmittal. However, this accounting procedure did not take place. Some
departments were not regularly producing transmittals and most or all were not
completing the final check between Auditor's Certificates and transmittals. Even the
County Court which, as previously noted had the best accounting system of all the county
departments, failed to check the Auditor's Certificates against the transmittals on a
regular basis. This failure of the accounting system largely explains why money was not
noticed missing until months or years after the fact.
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Testimony of several government witnesses established that the lack of
accounting and security procedures made it impossible to tell who was responsible for the
missing money. For example, Kelly White, a long time employee who worked in nearly
every possible position within the county offices, explained that when asked to take over
the responsibilities of receiving transmittals and producing A Cs after Ms. Klingner left,
she refused because of the lack of proper security and accounting; she did not want to be
falsely blamed for theft if money went missing in the future.
This is not to say that the Appellant was not partially to blame for the lacking
accounting process. Even she admitted that she should have been more diligent about
getting the ACs completed and holding the department's feet to the fire about getting her
regular transmittals. She acknowledged that if money went missing from the vaults, no
one would know. Complaints about the length of time that it took to complete the ACs
were lodged with the Clerk's Office. When directly brought to the Appellant's attention,
she explained that she was very busy but said she would get the ACs done ASAP. In a
perfect world, the AC would have been created immediately, thereby eliminating the
need to store the money in an unsecure location. However, gathering the transferred
funds and creating the ACs was a very small portion of the Appellant's job, as the County
Clerk, Mary Prisco, testified to. In fact, Mary Prisco testified that Ms. Klingner was the
driving force in the office to create new and improved accounting procedures.
In January 2014, the Appellant proposed a change in accounting procedures. The
proposed changes were meant to streamline the process and limit the amount of people
who had access to the funds received by the Clerk's Office. Most notably, this would
limit access to funds in the Boise County Indigent Services account; the employee
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previously responsible for this account had recently been disciplined for mishandling
County funds. This change to the process gave the Appellant more responsibility but also
increased her access to county funds. The County Clerk reviewed the proposed changes
and put them into place in the spring of 2014. While money did continue to go missing
after this new procedure, the amounts of both money and transactions decreased. Indigent
Services was one of the departments missing money after the changes.
Due to Ms. Klingner's inability to keep up with all the work she was assigned, a
new employee was hired in the early summer of 2014 to handle the intake of funds and
creation of transmittals. After this new employee was hired and trained, Ms. Klingner no
longer did this as part of her job. It should be noted that money continued to go missing
after the new employee took over this responsibility, including money that the State
alleged Ms. Klingner was responsible for stealing.
The investigation into accounting inaccuracies began in April 2014. As part of the
investigation, the Appellant and the other employees of the Clerk's Office were
interviewed. The Appellant was placed on administrative leave in the fall of 2014 and
submitted her resignation on December 8, 2014. At the time of her resignation, her desk
was cleaned out. Several checks and accompanying transmittals were located in the desk
during this search. These checks were all written to county departments around the time
the Appellant was put on administrative leave.
Despite the Appellant's employment and access ending, theft from the Boise
County Clerk's Office continued. In the months following her resignation, three different
incidents of theft from Boise County occurred leading to criminal investigations. During
the trial in this case, an investigation was underway into an additional theft. These thefts
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had a similar modus operandi to the thefts the Appellant was accused of committing.
Investigator's agreed that Ms. Klingner could not be responsible for these thefts. The
investigations led to the termination of two county employees, both of which were
employed at the same time as Ms. Klingner.
In the fall of 2014, Idaho State Police Detective Vicki Gooch served a series of
search warrants on the financial accounts of the Appellant and her family. These records
established that Ms. Klingner was in a difficult financial position during 2013 and 2014.
However, these same bank records also established that none of the missing money,
checks, or money orders were found in the Appellant's bank accounts and that there was
no noticeable change in her spending or financial position during the time the money
went missing. Further, established that this was not a problem unique to Ms. Klingner;
many or all of the employees were suffering from financial difficulties.
None of the missing checks or money orders were ever seen in the Appellant's
possession, cashed by the Appellant, nor deposited in her bank accounts. In fact, not a
single missing check or money order was ever negotiated by anyone. No one ever
witnessed the Appellant in unauthorized possession of county funds and no photographic,
video, audio, or physical evidence was presented at trial. In short, there was no direct
evidence linking Appellant to the crime.
Prior to sentencing on this case, the District Court held a Restitution Hearing on
March 22, 2017. Based upon the evidence submitted at that hearing and briefing from
both parties the District Court ordered the Appellant to pay $36, 376.37 in restitution.
On May 24, 2017, the District Court entered a Judgment of Conviction,
Suspended Sentence, and Order of Probation.
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STATEMENT OF CASE
This case involves the prosecution of Rana Klingner, the Defendant/Appellant on
two counts of felony Grand Theft, Idaho Code §§ 18-2403(1) and 18-2407(l)(b),
pursuant to an information filed on December 10, 2015, as set forth below:
COUNTI
That the defendant, RANA LYNN KLINGNER, on or between January 1,
2013 and December 31, 2013, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did
wrongfully take, obtain, or withhold cash, checks, and/or money orders in an
amount in excess of One Thousand Dollars ($1000.00) lawful money of the
United States, from the owner, Boise County, with the intent to deprive Boise
County of the same or to appropriate the same to herself.
COUNT II
That the defendant, RANA LYNN KLINGNER, on or between January 1,
2014 and December 31, 2014, in the County of Boise, State of Idaho, did
wrongfully take, obtain, or withhold cash, checks, and/or money orders in an
amount in excess of One Thousand Dollars ($1000.00) lawful money of the
United States, from the owner, Boise County, with the intent to deprive Boise
County of the same or to appropriate the same to herself.
The appeal brought by the Defendant/Appellant, involves the introduction of
testimony at trial regarding polygraph examinations and the subsequent objections,
motions, and jury instructions that followed. Additionally, the Court is asked to consider
matters. related to the restitution ordered by the District Court in this case.
The issue of polygraph examination evidence was first brought before the District
Court at a Trial Status Hearing on January 18, 2017. At that hearing, the Court made both
parties aware that polygraph evidence was not admissible and it would be the
responsibility of the parties to warn their witnesses against referencing it. In particular,
the Court stated as follows during the Pretrial Conference on January 18, 2017:
THE COURT: So there were polygraphs administered. Now, my understanding of
the law is that's not admissible in the evidence.
MR. ROSENTHAL [Prosecutor for the case]: Absolutely.
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THE COURT: And that I would probably issue an in limine order that it's not even
to be discussed and witnesses are to be cautioned not to even so much as bring it
up ...
Tr., Vol.1.18.17, p.20 L. 2-9.

Although a written order was never entered on this issue, the Court later
confirmed that its statements on January 18, 2017, were to carry the weight of an order.
Tr., Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17, p. 619 L. 2-7.
A six-day jury trial commenced on February 13, 2017, before Senior District
Court Judge Michael McLaughlin, in Ada County District Court. Venue in this case was
changed to Ada County in February of 2017, pursuant to a stipulation of the parties and
an order signed by the Court. The trial concluded on February 21, 2017. The jury
convicted the Defendant on both counts of the information.
On February 16, 2017, during day four of the six-day jury trial, the Defendant was
cross-examining State's witness Detective Gooch. During questioning, and on her own
initiative, Detective Gooch referenced polygraph examinations on two occasions during
her testimony. See Tr. Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17 p. 579, L. 17 - p. 580, L. 2; p. 583, L. 20-24.
While the witness only used the term "polygraph" once in her testimony, it is undisputed
that her use of the terms "technique" and "tool" reference polygraph examinations. After
cross-examination of this State witness, Defendant moved for mistrial based upon the
introduction of polygraph examination evidence. The Defendant argued that admission of
the testimony was a fundamental error making it impossible to continue without violating
the Defendant's right to a fair trial.
The State, through prosecutor Jay Rosenthal, initially objected to the Defendant's
motion for mistrial, arguing that, not only should the motion be denied, but that the
testimony opened the door for the State to now introduce further evidence of polygraph
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examinations. Both the Defendant and the State submitted briefs and oral argument to the
Court on these issues.
On February 17, 2017, the District Court denied the Defendant's motion. It found
that, while the testimony was erroneous, it was a result of the Defendant's invited error.
The District Court additionally ruled that, with the use of a curative jury instruction, the
error did not rise to the level of fundamental error. See Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 - 2.21.17, p.
621-622. The State withdrew its request to admit additional polygraph evidence and the
District Court admonished the parties that further reference to polygraph examinations
would not be tolerated.

1

Curative Jury Instruction 8(a) was provided to the jury prior to further testimony. 2
The Defendant's motion for an alternative jury instruction was denied by the Court. The
Defendant's motion to strike the testimony referencing polygraph examinations was also
denied.
Trial resumed on February 21, 2017. Prior to continuing the testimony, the State
moved for the introduction of an additional jury instruction or, in the alternative, to join
the Defendant's Motion for Mistrial. The State provided five alternative versions of the
proposed jury instruction, Instruction 8(b ). 3 The intent of Instruction 8(b) was to explain
that polygraph examinations are legal, widely used, and reliable method of ascertaining
the truth.

"And for further direction, again, polygraph testing is not to be discussed, not to be
presented." Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 - 2.21.17, p. 624, L. 13-17.
2 See Jury Instruction 8(A): R., Vol. I, p. 188.
3 Copies of the five alternative proposed 8(b) instructions were evidently not retained by
the District Court. However, each alternative instruction was read into the record by the
court: Tr., Vol. 2.13.17- 2.21.17, p. 638-640.
1
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When asked by the Court to address its alternative motion, the State argued that
the polygraph evidence introduced during the trial prevented both the State and Ms.
Klingner from receiving a fair trial and Jury Instruction 8(a) was insufficient to cure the
harm. Attorneys for the State candidly admitted that, despite their confidence in the
merits of their case, they believed that Ms. Klingner' s right to a fair trial was in jeopardy
and a mistrial should be granted. Mr. Rosenthal explained through the following:

MR. ROSENTHAL: So I think there has to be an explanation given or the jury simply
doesn't know. And, quite frankly, as loathe as I am to suggest a mistrial, I think it is
truly the only fair thing for both Ms. Klinger and, quite frankly, the State ...
THE COURT: Mr. Rosenthal, I just want to seek some clarification here. Are you
saying that without -- If the Court does not give one of the proposed Instruction 8B
instructions, if the Court were to decline to give that, would it be your position that
you would move for a mistrial on the case or are you moving for a mistrial at this
point in time?
MR. ROSENTHAL: In light of my understanding --Well, I think you can cure it, Your
Honor, with giving one of those instructions. Absent one of those instructions, I think
both sides, you know, Mr. Young already moved for a mistrial. We opposed that not
knowing exactly what the Court would and how they would do it.
But I think we would join in that because I truly, after thinking about it, after
reviewing my notes on your ruling of Friday, I clearly think we are in a situation
where we have no idea what the ;ury will or will not rely on notwithstanding the
instructions.
Though I have strong feelings about Ms. Klinger's involvement I also have incredibly
strong feelings that she is entitled to a fair trial and a fair iury.
Tr., Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17, p. 644, L.3-7 and p. 644 L.21 -p. 645, L. 18 (emphasis
added). The State continued:

MR. ROSENTHAL: I think we 're in an impossible situation.
THE COURT: All right. So, again, sometimes the Judge is a little slow on the
uptake, but you 're saying based upon the totality of circumstances as we sit right
now, it would be the State's position that you 're moving for a mistrial as well?
MR. ROSENTHAL: Absent the corrective, whatever you want to call that instruction,
yes, Your Honor, definitely.
Tr., Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17, p. 646, L. 5 - 14.
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The District Court declined to give proposed jury instruction 8(b) and took the
Motion for Mistrial under advisement, pending the remainder of the trial. The Court
stated: "I'll do this. I'll take the motion for mistrial for, frankly, both the defense and the
State under advisement; see how the rest of the trial works its way through. It's a first for
me. I've not had two requests for mistrial from both sides. I'll take it under advisement."
Tr., Vol. 2.13.1 -2.21.17, p. 654, L. 23 -p. 655, L. 3.
After the District Court issued its decision on the previous matter, the Defendant
formally objected to the introduction of evidence regarding "techniques," "tools," "tool"
or other terms, as an indirect way of referencing polygraph examinations. See Tr., Vol.
2.13.17-2.21.17, p. 656, L. 11. Asking that no testimony using these terms be admitted,
the Defendant argued that this was no different than actually using the term "polygraph,"
thus, violating the District Court's admonishment, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, and
directly contradicting Jury Instruction 8(a). The Defendant raised this as a potential issue
on the record and was reassured by the State that it did not intend to elicit such testimony.
However, the State changed its position and gave the Court notice that it intended to elicit
testimony to this effect. See Tr., Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17, p. 655, L. 24-p. 656, L. 8. Thus,
the Defendant made an official objection on the record.
The State assured the Court that it would refrain from actually using the term
"polygraph," but acknowledged it intended to move forward with a line of questioning
that had a high likelihood of resulting in unjust harm to one party or the other. 4 The State
expressed that it believed it had no other choice. Due to the Court's ruling on the Motion
"I realize it is a very thin walk I'm walking on. And I appreciate the Court's obvious
control of the courtroom. And I will stay within that control. But I think it throws this
trial into a situation where there's a high likelihood of unfairness for one side or the
other." Tr., Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17, p. 644, L. 15-20.
4
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for Mistrial, the State was under the impression that, if it did not ask the contemplated
line of questioning - thereby clarifying the previous testimony addressing polygraph
examinations - the risk that the jury would improperly interpret the testimony as harmful
to the State's case was too high. In essence, the State argued that sustaining the objection
- thereby limiting the State's ability to reference these polygraph examinations- would
impede upon the State's right to a fair trial.
In response, the District Court ruled that testimony as to the tools and procedures
utilized in embezzlement investigations was relevant and declined to limit the State from
introducing the desired testimony. 5 However, the District Court noted the Defendant's
objection for the record and determined that it would "be deemed a continuing objection
to any references to tools or techniques utilized by law enforcement." Tr., Vol. 2.13.172.21.17, p. 657, L. 11-14.

For the first time since February 16, the jury was brought back into the courtroom
and the State began its redirect-examination of Detective Gooch.
As it warned it would do, and without ever using the word "polygraph," the State
asked a divisive line of questions relating to polygraph examinations:
Q:

A:
Q:

A:
Q:

(BY MR. ROSENTHAL) In the 37 years you have been a member of law
enforcement you have developed a number of investigative tools and
methods, have you not?
(BY DET. GOOCH) Yes.
And these are tools and methods that you were taught during your
training as a law enforcement officer?
Yes.
And are these tools and methods things that you use to the best of your
ability to determine individuals who are included as targets or excluded

The Court later clarified this decision. It explained that the purpose of its ruling was to
allow the State sufficient leaway to explain that there was nothing improper or illegal
about the detective's use of tools and techniques utilized in the investigation. Tr., Vol.
3.22.17, p. 67, L. 14-19.
5
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A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

as targets of any crime you might be investigating?
Yes.
And are you very particular in only using those tools that are legal in
the State of Idaho?
Yes.
And the tools and methods that are used to your knowledge are they
also used by the federal bureau of investigation?
Yes.
In fact, you have recently been working a number of cases with the FBI
have you not?
Yes.
And are these tools and methods that you utilize to your knowledge
regularly used by commercial organization is to determine truth or
falsity?
I don't know about that.
All right. But these methods that you used in this case of alleged
embezzlement against Ms. Klinger are the same ones you have used for
the past 37 or so years?
At least 30, yes.
30 all right?
Some of the tools weren't available.
And these methods, these tools, do you describe them in explicit detail
in your police reports that you prepared during an investigation of a
case?
Yes, and if I don't, then the people employ to utilize their tools do.
All right. And you 're aware that all of your reports have previously
been delivered to Mr. Young
Yes.
In fact he's had them for more than a year and a half or so?
Yes.
And again these investigative methods or tools that you utilize to
include or exclude people, why are those necessary? Why do you do
that? What's the purpose of them?
To get to the truth of the matter.
All right. Give you direction and focus; is that correct?
Yes.
So in short, the tools and methods you used are standard to include or
exclude individuals accused, are they not?
Yes.
And isn't it as important to you to exclude those not involved as it is to
include those allegedly involved?
Yes.

Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 - 2.21.17, p. 658, L. 22 - p. 661, L. 4. At no time did the District
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Court ever sustain the Defendant's continuing objection.
After the State completed its examination of the witness, the Defendant once
again moved for a mistrial. The Defendant argued that that the use of the terms "tool" or
"technique" during redirect-examination did not fool anyone and, when viewed in the
context of the questions asked and the testimony as a whole, was an obvious reference to
polygraph examinations. Additionally, the Defendant argued that the testimony was in
direct contradiction with Jury Instruction 8(a); thereby eliminating any potential curative
effect of the instruction. See Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 -2.21.17, p. 673, L. 6-17.
The District Court denied the Defendant's motion for the time being and ruled
that, as it had with the previous matters, it would take the matter under advisement. In
making its ruling, the Court voiced its disagreement with the Defendant's assertions; in
the opinion of the Court, by not actually using the term "polygraph" the testimony was
ambiguous and could be a reference to many different investigative techniques or tools.

See Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 -2.21.17, p. 673, L. 21-25.
After concluding the testimony and closing arguments, the jury came back with
its verdict in the evening hours of February 21, 2017, and the trial concluded. After a
week had passed without notice from the District Court on the motions it had taken under
advisement, the Defendant filed a Renewed Motion For Mistrial on February 28, 2017. 6
Subsequently, on March 7, 2017, the Defendant also filed a Motion for New Trial 7 and a
Memorandum in Support of both motions. 8
The Court held a Motion and Restitution Hearing on March 22, 2017. At this

R., Vol. I, p. 209-210.
R., Vol. I, p. 211-213.
s R., Vol. I, p. 218-238.
6

7
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hearing the State presented its case as to restitution and the District Court heard oral
argument on the undecided motions. As was expected, based upon the verdict, the State
withdrew its Motion For Mistrial that was taken under advisement.
The State's case as to restitution consisted of one exhibit and no testimony. The
lone exhibit was a three page unswom representation, a spreadsheet, created by the State
for the hearing, that listed the individual transactions the State claimed should be
included in the restitution. Ex. State's Exhibit 1. For everyone's ease of use (rather than
having to flip through several binders of exhibits) Counsel for the Defendant agreed to
stipulate to the spreadsheets admission as an illustrative summary. However, after the
exhibit was admitted, based upon very cursory mental math, the Defendant discovered
that the totals on the spreadsheet were incorrect. It was brought to the attention of the
Court and upon reexamination the State admitted that the exhibit was in fact inaccurate.
The State then made the representation that the actual total was $36,376.37, not the
$46,922.33 it had originally claimed. The Court indicated that it would take the
spreadsheet and the State's new calculation under advisement.
After the restitution matter was completed, the Court heard oral argument on the
defense motions. Upon the conclusion of argument from the parties, the Court once again
took the motions under advisement. At the end of the hearing, the Court invited the
parties to submit further briefing on any of the matters still before the Court. Both parties
filed supplemental briefing
The Defendant's Memorandum As To Restitution was filed on April 10, 2017. 9
The arguments made in this memorandum are important to the appellate case currently

9

R., Vol. I, p. 262-281.
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before the Court. The Defendant made several arguments including:
1. The State had failed to meet its burden of proof at the Restitution Hearing.

2. The State had failed to present sufficient proof necessary to label the Idaho
Counties Risk Management Program (ICRMP) a victim of the crime. 10

3. Restitution should not be ordered for unnegotiated checks or money orders.
On May 3, 2017 the District Court issued its Memorandum, Decision, and Order

Re: Defendant's Post Trial Motions. 11 This Memorandum, Decision, and Order denied
both of the Defendant's Motion for Mistrial as well as her Motion for New Trial. In
addition, the Court ruled against the Defendant as to the restitution issues. The Court
entered a finding that the State had met its burden of proof as to restitution in the
requested amount of $36,376.37.
The District Court entered a Judgment of Conviction, Suspended Sentence, and
Order of Probation in this case on May 24, 2017.

ICRMP is a third party insurer who the State identified as a victim seeking restitution
for economic loss due to insurance payments made to Boise County.
11 R., Vol. I, p. 284-303.
10
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ARGUMENT
I. The District Court Committed Reversible Error By Denying The Party's Joint
Motion for Mistrial.
For the reasons that follow, Appellant is requesting that this Court vacate the
judgment of conviction entered by the District Court and remand the case for a new trial.
This request is made due to the District Court's denial of the Appellant's Motion for
Mistrial on February 16, 2017. This motion was made due to a government witness'
introduction of polygraph examination evidence. Her testimony informed the jury that
polygraph examinations were utilized by law enforcement to include or exclude potential
suspects during the investigation in the case. This testimony was prejudicial to the
Appellant and deprived her of a fair trial. When viewed in the context of the entire
record, the District Court's denial of the Motion for Mistrial is reversible error.
The Defendant's Motion for Mistrial initially stemmed from the following
testimony:
Q:

(BY MR. YOUNG) Okay. Right. You ident(fied [on direct~examination]
that you had put several search warrants together to look at the bank
account information of Ms. Klinger for potential deposits I assume?

A:

(BY DET. GOOCH) Yes, o.f missing monies, yes.

Q:

And the State has already agreed that those deposits did not go into Ms.
Klinger's account. Did you look at anyone else's bank accounts?

A:

No, we utilized investigative techniques to eliminate the need to.

Q:

One more time. Can you repeat that?

A:

We employed a tool available to us to look at other potential suspects,
and we were able to eliminate those people through that tool.

Q:

How did that take place?

A:

It's in the form of polygraphs.

Tr., Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17, p. 579, L. 12- p.580. L. 2.

20

Immediately after the witness gave her answer, Defense counsel paused, gathered
his papers, and then proceeded with a line of questioning unrelated to the search of
financial accounts. The Defendant did not object to the testimony at this time.
Thereafter, Defense counsel continued with a line of questioning from earlier in
his cross-examination, 12 relating to the witness's sworn testimony from the preliminary
hearing in this case:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

(BY MR. YOUNG) Okay. Now, we've gone over the fact that you and I have
spoken on this matter before in the preliminary hearing, correct?
(BY DET. GOOCH) Yes.
And you testified under oath at that hearing?
Yes.
Is that right?
Yes.
And those answers you gave were honest answers?
Yes.
Investigator Gooch, do you leave open the possibility that someone
other than Rana Klingner is responsible for stealing money from Boise
County?
I would say today, no, but because of the investigative techniques that
were available to us at the time, the tools that we talked about. So to
eliminate all other possibdities within the clerk's office, we utilized
those tools.
Do you remember testifying under oath?
Yes.
And do you remember saying that you left open the possibility that
someone other than Rana Klinger committed this crime?
That I left that possibility -- well, it's possible. Okay. It's possible.

Tr., Vol. 2.I 3.17-2.21.17, p. 583, L. 6 - p. 584 L. 6.
When cross-examination of the witness concluded, the parties joined in asking to
take up issues outside the presence of the jury. The Defendant objected to the testimony
and moved for a mistrial. The District Court denied the Defendant's Motion for Mistrial,
finding invited error on the part of the Defendant. The Court explained as follows:

12

See Tr., Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17, p. 550, L. 5 - 7.
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The Court: I'll find that -- and I don't -- in making this finding, I'm not finding that
invited error was intentionally brought about. It may have been accidental. But,
frankly, at the point that the witness talked about her response, "It's in the form of
polygraphs," there was every opportunity at that point for the defense, who elicited
this testimony -- it wasn't the State; it was the defense -- that there certainly could
have been a request to take up this matter outside the presence of the jury. And that
was not done. In all fairness to the defense, you went on to an entirely different other
area.
But then, again, there was this refocus that invited this discussion about these
investigative techniques when the questioning was whether or not there was
someone else other than Rana Klinger who was responsible for stealing the money.
So continuing on that line of questioning clearly was error. It was error on the part
of the defense, and I'll find that it was invited error.
Tr., Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17 p. 620 L. 25 - p. 621, L. 19. The Court gave Jury Instruction
8(a) to cure the harm caused by the error. R., Vol. I, p. 188.
On February 21, 2017, the State joined the Defendant's Motion for Mistrial.
Prosecutor Rosenthal explained, stating:

Mr. Young already moved for a mistrial. We opposed that not knowing exactly what
the Court would and how they would do it.
But I think we would join in that because I truly, after thinking about it, after
reviewing my notes on your ruling of Friday, I clearly think we are in a situation
where we have no idea what the jury will or will not rely on notwithstanding the
instructions.
Though I have strong feelings about Ms. Klinger's involvement I also have
incredibly strong feelings that she is entitled to afair trial and afair jury
Tr., Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17, p. 644, L.3-7.

A. Standard of Review
In criminal cases, motions for mistrial are governed by Idaho Criminal Rule 29 .1,
which provides, in part, "[a] mistrial may be declared upon motion of the defendant,
when there occurs during the trial an error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct
inside or outside the courtroom, which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the
defendant of a fair trial." The decision whether to grant a mistrial rests within the sound
discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of
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discretion. State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 902, 828 P.2d 1304, 1307 (1992); State v.
Talmage, 104 Idaho 249, 254, 658 P.2d 920, 926 (1983) (overruled on other grounds);
State v. Ramsbottom, 89 Idaho 1, 10,402 P.2d 384, 389 (1965).

The question on review is not whether the trial court reasonably exercised its
discretion under the circumstances existing when the motion was made. Instead, the
question is whether the event that brought about the motion constitutes reversible error
when viewed in the context of the entire record. State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665
P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct.App.1983). The focus is on the continuing impact of the incident on
the trial. Id. The error will be considered harmless if "the appellate court is able to
declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility that the event
complained of contributed to the conviction." State v. Morgan, 144 Idaho 861, 863-64,
172 P.3d 1136, 1138-39 (Ct. App. 2007).

B. The Polygraph Evidence Admitted During Cross-Examination Was Inadmissible.
The United States Supreme Court, in U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998), left
the decision as to the admissibility of polygraph evidence up to individual jurisdictions. 13
In Idaho, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[p ]olygraph evidence is inadmissible to
vouch for the credibility of a witness." State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 525, 81 P.3d 1230,
1235 (2003). However, "[it] may be admissible in instances where the parties stipulate to
the admission of the evidence, in probation revocation hearings, and in other informal
hearings where the rules of evidence do not apply, at the discretion of the trial court or
presiding official." Id.; State v. Fain, 116 Idaho 82, 86-87, 744 P.2d 252, 256-57 (1989)

The Court did however warn: "there is simply no way to know in a particular case
whether a polygraph examiner's conclusion is accurate, because certain doubts and
uncertainties plague even the best polygraph exams."
13
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("As a general rule, results of polygraph examinations are inadmissible absent a
stipulation by both parties").
In this case, the polygraph examination evidence was inadmissible, according to

the standard set forth by the Idaho Supreme Court. In this case, the parties did not
stipulate to admission of polygraph examination evidence. To the contrary, the Court
ruled in a preliminary hearing that such testimony was inadmissible. In addition, the
polygraph examination evidence in this case was introduced during trial where the rules
of evidence apply, unlike a less formal probation revocation hearing. As such, the District
Court correctly found that the introduction of the testimony was an error. See Tr., Vol.

2.13.17 2.21.17, p. 620, L. 25 -p.621. L. 19.
Further, the District Court found that admission of the polygraph evidence was
error, so there is no need to address that issue here. What next needs to be addressed is
whether the Court abused its discretion by denying the motion for mistrial due to its
finding of invited error on the part of the Defendant.
C. Admission Of The Polygraph Evidence Was Not Invited Error.
The Appellant recognizes that if this court affirms the District Court's finding of
invited error, the Appellant's request as to this issue must be denied. This issue is a
barrier to the courts remaining analysis as, if the error that the appellant relies upon as the
basis for the motion was invited, the District Court's denial of that motion cannot be
reversible. However, the District Court's finding of invited error was based upon an
inaccurate review of Idaho law and the facts of this case. It erred in ruling that the
testimony at issue was a result of invited error by the Appellant. This finding should be
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reversed and the court should review the District Court's denial of the Motion for Mistrial
under the abuse of discretion standard.
Idaho courts have long held that "one may not successfully complain of errors
one has consented to or acquiesced in. In other words, invited errors are not reversible."
State v. Caudill, 109 Idaho 222, 226, 706 P.2d 456,460 (1985); State v. Owsley, 105

Idaho 836,673 P.2d 436 (1983); State v. Atkinson, 124 Idaho 816,864 P.2d 654 (App.
1993) ("If it was invited, it cannot be regarded as reversible error."). The doctrine of
invited error applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his own conduct
induces the commission of the error. People v. Perez, 23 Cal.3d 545, 153 Cal.Rptr. 40,
591 P.2d 63, 66, n. 3 (Cal.1979).
The District Court explained that its finding of invited error as to the witnesses
first reference to polygraph testimony, was due to (1) the Defendant's failure to
immediately object and request that the matter be taken up outside of the presence of the
jury, and (2) the witnesses answer was given during the defendant's cross-examination.
The Court stated:
I'll find that -- and I don't -- in making this finding, I'm not finding that invited error
was intentionally brought about. It may have been accidental. But, frankly, at the
point that the witness talked about her response, "It's in the form of polygraphs,"
there was every opportunity at that point for the defense, who elicited this testimony
-- it wasn't the State; it was the defense -- that there certainly could have been a
request to take up this matter outside the presence of the jury. And that was not
done.

Simply because the error occurred during cross-examination by the defense does
not mean the error was invited. See State v. Simonson, 112 Idaho 451, 732 P.2d 689
(Ct.App.1987). If all erroneous testimony introduced on cross-examination was
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automatically invited error, this issue would be unnecessary for this court to ever address;
invited error would be determined based upon which party was asking the questions.
Further, while it may be the District Court's position that the objection was
untimely (although the court never made this assertion), due to counsel's choice to wait
to object until after cross-examination was completed, 14 however, this does not make the
testimony "invited error." For error to be considered "invited" the witnesses answer must
have been "accurate, fair, and responsive" to the question asked. State v. Atkinson, 124
Idaho 816, 864 P.2d 654 (App. 1993).
In support of its denial of the motion due to Defendant's invited error, the District
Court drew parallels to State v. Atkinson, providing a fair and accurate summation of the
facts and findings as part of its briefing:
In Atkinson, Eppelman, a witness for the state, was instructed by "counsel for the
state ... that he was not to bring up the fact that Sam had been thrown from the
train." Id. On cross-examination, Eppelman testified, in response to a question from
counsel for the defense as to when he went up to the defendant and pushed him in
the chest, that it was "[a]fter he threw Sam off [the train]." 124 Idaho at 820-21, 864
P.2d at 659.
The Idaho Court of Appeals held:
The witness gave an accurate, fair and responsive answer to defense counsel's
question of "When?" Defense counsel subsequently admitted on the record that he
did not know what the witness was going to answer in response to that question ...
Defense counsel's failure to know the answer to the question or his
misunderstanding of the sequence of events does not excuse the invited nature of
the error. A misstep on dangerous ground, where counsel has voluntarily ventured
but is unsure of possible responses, may result in invited error, and if so, cannot
then be grounds for a mistrial. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Atkinson's
motion for a mistrial.124 Idaho at 821, 864 P.2d at 659"

Counsel determined that objecting immediately and asking to take up the issue outside
of the presence of the jury would only draw further attention to the testimony, thus
increasing the harm the testimony created. In counsel's opinion, the bell had already been
rung, the jury could not unheard the testimony; the only option moving forward was to
mitigate the damage to his client.
14
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Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Defendant's Post-Trial Motions, p. 10-11.
The District Court's memorandum is correct, portions of this case are very similar
to Atkinson: The erroneous testimony occurred during cross-examination of a witness for
the State, Counsel for the Defendant admitted that the testimony was unexpected, and the
State claims that it had warned the witness not to discuss polygraph examinations.
However, the District Court fails to address the requirement that the witness' answer
must still be accurate, fair, and responsive. If a witness's answer to a question is
inaccurate, unfair, or unresponsive then, by its nature, the answer is unexpected and
cannot be considered invited. Because the District Court failed to address this key
component of the analysis, the reasoning behind its ruling is flawed and should be
overturned.
The witness's response was not accurate. Detective Gooch testified that her use of
polygraph examinations eliminated the need to look into other potential suspects financial
accounts, after failing to find the missing money in Ms. Klingner's possession:

Q:
A:

Q:
A:
Q:
A:

And the State has already agreed that those deposits did not go into Ms.
Klinger's account. Did you look at anyone else's bank accounts?
No, we utilized investigative techniques to eliminate the need to.
One more time. Can you repeat that?
We employed a tool available to us to look at other potential suspects,
and we were able to eliminate those people through that tool.
How did that take place?
It's in the form of polygraphs.

Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 - 2.21.17, p. 579, L. 12- p.580. L. 2. This is inaccurate and
unsupported by the facts.
Detective Gooch' s investigation into the financial accounts of potential suspects
was very limited and only lasted for a number of weeks, starting in the fall of 2014 and
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ending in the winter of 2014. See Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 -2.21.17, p. 545, L. 1-20. The first
polygraph examination in this case was not given until April 2, 2015; nearly six-months
after Detective Gooch last served a search warrant for an individual's financial records.
No additional search warrants were issued after the polygraph examinations took place.
When questioned about this, counsel for the State admitted that the timeline of events did
not support Det. Gooch's testimony. See Tr., Vol. 3.22.17, p. 71, L. 1 -p. 72, L. 11. 15
Further, the facts of the investigation do not support Det. Gooch's testimony. The
testimony implied that Det. Gooch determined it was unnecessary to subpoena the
financial records of other potential suspects because she had eliminated all those
individuals from consideration based on polygraph examinations -presumably because
they passed polygraph examinations. This is, at best, inaccurate. The alternate implication
that could be drawn from the testimony is that the Appellant took and failed a polygraph
examination, thus eliminating the other suspects. This too is inaccurate.
Many county employees working in the Clerk's Office, or those who worked in
other departments but had regular unrestricted access to the Clerk's Office, declined or
were never asked to take a polygraph examination. In fact, Det. Gootch admits that she
did not even interview many of these individuals. See Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 - 2.21.17, p. 559561. Law enforcement did not attempt to subpoena those individual's financial accounts
and they certainly were not eliminated through used of polygraph examinations.
Even more telling as to the inaccuracy of the testimony is that, of the individuals
who took polygraph examinations, not everyone passed. One individual even failed

Counsel for the State attempts to argue that it was an "honest answer" even if the
testimony did not match the timeline or her previous testimony; i.e. incorrect does not
mean dishonest. Honest is not a prong of the test established in the case law.
15
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multiple times. Just like the others, there was no attempt to obtain the bank records of
those individuals who failed polygraph examinations.
As it did with the timeline, counsel for the State acknowledged that the Det.
Gooch's testimony and the facts of the case did not exactly add up. In direct conflict with
the statements made by Det. Gooch during cross-examination, the State explained that
individuals were eliminated as suspects for a myriad of reasons and as a result of the
cumulative investigation, not one singular test. Further, while other bank records weren't
subpoenaed, [individuals] were able to be dismissed as suspects for a myriad of reasons,
that entire picture of the investigation. And as such, it can't be seen as one tool used to
narrow down the suspect or narrow down and dismiss other suspects. See Tr., Vol.

3.22.17, p. 71, L. 19 - p. 72, L. 2.
The witnesses response was not fair. When evaluating the entire context of Det.
Gooch's testimony, several factors, listed below, should result in this Court finding that if
the witness's responses were not willfully unfair to the Defendant, generally
inadmissible, and in violation of the District Court's instruction, then, at a minimum, she
should have known that the responses were likely to be improper.
The issue of testimony referencing polygraph examination evidence was brought
up prior to trial by the parties during the Trial Status Hearing on January 18, 2017. At
that hearing, the District Court made both parties aware that polygraph evidence was not
admissible and it would be the responsibility of the parties to warn their witnesses against
referencing it. Due to this admonishment, Defense counsel reasonably and fairly assumed
the State would instruct its witnesses against providing any testimony referencing
polygraph examinations. The State even said on multiple occasions that it did just that. In
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formulating and asking its questions on cross-examination, the Defendant reasonably
relied on the witness to abide by the directions given to her by counsel for the State.
Detective Gooch is a not a rookie cop

she is a 36-year law enforcement veteran,

she holds a Master's Level Post Certification, she has performed investigations in
conjunction with Federal law enforcement, she has been teaching college level criminal
justice classes at Boise State University and the College of Western Idaho (including
teaching classes about the use of polygraph examinations) for the last 14 years, she has
performed a large number of embezzlement investigations over the course of her career,
she has testified in court dozens or potentially hundreds of times, she has been trained in
the use of polygraph examinations, and she has used polygraph examinations in her
investigations for at least 30 years. See Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 - 2.21.17, p. 527-528, p. 540, p.
658-661. It appears unlikely that, with all her training and experience in law enforcement
and investigations, her experience as a witness, and her decades of experience using
polygraph examinations in her investigations, she did not know that testimony regarding
polygraph examinations was generally inadmissible.
Lastly, the Appellant argues that if, in every case where polygraph examinations
are used as part of the investigation, law enforcement witnesses were able to testify that
their conclusions are based upon "tools" or "techniques" thereby leaving the defense
unable to question the validity and process that led to the conclusions without risking
invited error, defendants are put at an unreasonable and unfair disadvantage. When
evaluated either cumulatively or individually, the above factors show that the responses
provided by Det. Gooch were not fair.
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The court may find some guidance from the Nebraska and Kansas Supreme
Courts. The Nebraska Supreme Court, following the logic of the Kansas Supreme Court,
determined that reference to polygraph examinations by a State's witness on crossexamination was not invited error by the defense because it was the responsibility of the
State to instruct its witness of the obligation not to reference polygraph evidence. State v.

Riley, 281 Neb. 394, 406-07, 796 N.W.2d 371, 380 (2011).
The District Court's finding of invited error regarding the witness' second
response involving polygraph examination evidence, was due to the Defendant's
continued line of questioning into "investigative techniques." The Court stated:

" ... this refocus that invited this discussion about these investigative techniques
when the questioning was whether or not there was someone else other than Rana
Klinger who was responsible for stealing the money. So continuing on that line of
questioning clearly was error. It was error on the part of the defense, and I'll find
that it was invited error. "
Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 -2.21.17, p. 527, L. 12-19.
This line of questioning was not addressing "investigative techniques" as argued
by the Court. It was a line of questions meant to illicit evidence of the testimony
previously provided by the witness at the preliminary hearing. The questions at trial went
as follows:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

(BY MR. YOUNG) Okay. Now, we've gone over the fact that you and I have
spoken on this matter before in the preliminary hearing, correct?
(BY DET. GOOCH) Yes.
And you test(fied under oath at that hearing?
Yes.
Is that right?
Yes.
And those answers you gave were honest answers?
Yes.
Investigator Gooch, do you leave open the possibility that someone
other than Rana Klingner is responsible for stealing money from Boise
County?
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l would say today, no, but because of the investigative techniques that
were available to us at the time, the tools that we talked about. So to
eliminate all other possibilities within the clerk's office, we utilized
those tools.
Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 - 2.21.17, p. 583, L. 6-24. At no point does the Defendant's questions
A:

every reference tools, techniques, or other means of investigation. Instead, the questions
sought to build upon answers previously given establishing two things: that Det. Gooch
had testified at the preliminary hearing and that she had not performed any additional
investigation in this case. Tr., Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17, p. 550, L. 5-7; p. 554, L. 15-20; p.
553 L. 19-23. This established that her testimony provided at the preliminary hearing
must still be her testimony at trial.
The response given by the witness was neither accurate nor responsive. As noted
above, Det. Gooch had already testified that there had been no changes or developments
in the case since the preliminary hearing. Any response she gave at the preliminary
hearing must still be true. Additionally, the Defendant asked a series of lead up questions
alerting the witness to the fact that he was about to ask her about one of her responses at
the preliminary hearing.
At the preliminary hearing, Detective Gooch testified that she left open the
possibility that someone other than the Defendant was responsible for stealing money
from Boise County. There was no reference to polygraph examinations or tools used to
eliminate other suspects. For this reason, the Court should reverse the District Court's
finding of invited error.
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D. The District Court's Denial Of The Motion For Mistrial Was Reversible Error.

The introduction of polygraph evidence by Det. Gooch caused significant harm to
the Appellant such that there is a reasonable possibility that it contributed to her
conviction.
The testimony was not a mere mention of the word "polygraph" as the District
Court concluded in its decision. The testimony provided the jurors with significant
information about the results of those polygraph examinations. Based upon the testimony
the jury could reasonably draw one of two potential conclusions: 1. Ms. Klingner was
charged with the crime because she failed a polygraph examination or, 2. Ms. Klingner
was charged with a crime because everyone else passed a polygraph examination.
Even the State agreed that the testimony provided facts about the results of
polygraph examinations: "Clearly the testimony of the officer indicated that process of
elimination or inclusion included the polygraph." In fact, after initially arguing that the
testimony was harmless error, the State changed its position and joined the Defendant's
Motion For Mistrial based upon its belief that both parties were significantly harmed by
the testimony:
MR. ROSENTHAL: "I think it throws this trial into a situation where there's a
high likelihood of unfairness for one side or the other."
"Mr. Young already moved for a mistrial. We opposed that not knowing exact! y
what the Court would and how they would do it. But I think we would join in that
because I truly, after thinking about it, after reviewing my notes on your ruling of
Friday, I clearly think we are in a situation where we have no idea what the jury
will or will not rely on notwithstanding the instructions."
"Though I have strong feelings about Ms. Klinger's involvement in this case, I
also have incredibly strong feelings that she is entitled to a fair trial and a fair
jury ... I think we're in an impossible situation."
Tr., Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17, p. 644, L.3-7.
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As can be seen in the "Statement of Facts" portion of this brief, the State's case
relied entirely upon circumstantial evidence and testimony from individuals that had
motive, access, and opportunity to be responsible for the crime themselves. In fact, there
is not even definitive proof that a crime was committed, none of the money was ever
recovered, none of the checks or money orders were cashed or deposited, and Det. Gooch
admitted in her testimony that law enforcement assumed the money was stolen so they
did not search county offices or storage to see if it had been misplaced. Further, there was
significant circumstantial evidence that someone other than Ms. Klingner could be
responsible for the thefts: There was a lack of acceptable accounting procedures being
followed, security was insufficient, many people had access the locations that the money
was being stored, other employees had been disciplined for improperly handling money,
documents that would have helped to identify who was responsible for the money were
destroyed or missing, similar thefts had occurred prior to those Ms. Klingner was accused
of, and similar thefts continued after her employment ended.
The District Court erroneously assessed the evidence in this case, and the effect of
the polygraph evidence. Both parties at separate times described the evidence as
circumstantial and even Det. Gooch testified that someone else could potentially be
responsible for the thefts. Both parties also moved for mistrial due to the harm caused by
the evidence. Even if the District Court's assessment of the case was correct, had it used
the wrong standard in its ruling that the error was harmless: describing the evidence as
"compelling" and "strong" and the reference to polygraph examinations as "not
significant" rather than concluding as to whether was a reasonable possibility that the
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polygraph evidence contributed to the conviction. Memorandum Decision and Order Re:

Defendant's Post-Trial Motions, p. 13.
Further, the curative instruction, which the District Court continually relied upon
in its analysis that the error was harmless, was insufficient to cure the harm caused by the
polygraph evidence. There are undoubtedly situations in which notwithstanding the most
exemplary charge, a juror will find it impossible to disregard such a prejudicial statement.

State v. Simonson, 112 Idaho 451, 732 P.2d 689 (Ct.App.1987). "The naive assumption
that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury ... all practicing
lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction." Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,453,
69 S.Ct. 716, 723, 93 L.Ed.2d 790, 799, (1949).
The inability of the instruction to overcome the harm was due to the fact that this
was not a case like Booth or Perry, where the reference to polygraph examinations did
not tell the jury anything about the results. Both parties made this argument in their
motions for mistrial.
For the reasons listed above, the District Court created reversible error by denying
the Defendant's Motion For Mistrial (which the State later joined) due to harm caused by
the polygraph evidence in light of the record as a whole.
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II. By Permitting The Admission Of Additional Polygraph Evidence And Denying
The Appellant's Motion For Mistrial, District Court Committed Reversible Error.
In anticipation of the State's redirect examination of Detective Gooch, the
Defendant entered an objection on the record to the introduction of evidence using
"techniques," "tools," "tool" or other terms as an indirect way of referencing polygraph
examinations. Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 -2.21.17, p. 656, L. 11. The Defendant argued that this
testimony was essentially the introduction of evidence of polygraph examinations in
violation the District Court's admonishment, the Idaho Rules Of Evidence, Idaho case
law, and would directly contradict Jury Instruction 8(a). The Defendant had previously
raised this as a potential issue and was reassured by the State that it did not intend to elicit
such testimony. However, the State now intended to elicit testimony to this effect. See
Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 - 2.21.17, p. 655, L. 24

p. 656, L. 8.

The State assured the Court that it would refrain from actually using the term
"polygraph" but acknowledged that it intended to move forward with a line of
questioning that had a high likelihood of resulting in unjust harm to one party or the
other. Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 - 2.21.17, p. 644, L. 15-20. The State expressed that it saw no
other choice due to the District Court's ruling on the parties joint Motion For Mistrial.
The State believed that, if it did not clarify the previous testimony addressing polygraph
examinations, it risked the jury improperly interpreting the testimony as harmful to the
State's case was too high. In essence, the State argued that limiting its ability to reference
polygraph examinations indirectly would impede upon the State's right to a fair trial:
MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, 1 would ask for further clar(fication as to we
discussed on Friday the - how much leeway we'll be allowed as far as questioning
into techniques, tools, tool. And at that time I was indicated by Mr. Rosenthal that
he didn't have that on his list of redirect questions ...
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MR. ROSENTHAL: Judge, I intend to ask Detective Gooch about tools and
techniques that she used in that -- to her 37 years of knowledge, being a professor
of criminal justice, that the tools and techniques she used are standard tools used
by law enforcement in this state, used by the department of parole and probation
to enforce probation orders made by judges such as yourself, and through a litany
of the tools and techniques that are approved and utilized by every law
enforcement agency in this state.
THE COURT: And you would object to that, correct?
MR. YOUNG: Yes, I would, Your Honor.
THE COURT: All right. I think certainly it's relevant if she utilized the tools and
procedures in this case that were utilized by law enforcement in embezzlement
cases. I think that's relevant. I think going into parolees or probationers, that sort
of thing, I think that's a little bit far afield.
MR. ROSENTHAL: But, Judge -- well, again I'm just stating the State's position;
I'm not arguing with the Judge. But, in fact, these are standard techniques that
are used in every type of criminal investigation in her experience....
And, again, I don't want to end up being cross-ways with the Court, but I think the
State is entitled to have a fair trial, and I really think this has been become a
problem.
THE COURT: Well, my instructions are that you're entitled to inquire of
Detective Gooch as to techniques that she used, are they used in this type of an
investigation.
And, Mr. Young, your objection will be notedfor the record and will be deemed a
continuing objection to any references to tools or techniques utilized by law
enforcement.
Tr., Vol. 2.13.17-2.21.17, p. 655, L. 15

p. 657, L. 14.

Detective Gooch went on to testify about the use of polygraph evidence in this case,
its legality, its acceptance within the law enforcement community, its use by private and
public entities, and its validity for ascertaining the truth:
Q:

A:
Q:

A:
Q:

A:
Q:

(BY MR. ROSENTHAL) And these are tools and methods that you were
taught during your training as a law e11forcement officer?
(BY DET. GOOCH) Yes.
And are these tools and methods things that you use to the best of your
ability to determine individuals who are included as targets or excluded
as targets of any crime you might be investigating?
Yes.
And are you very particular in only using those tools that are legal in
the State of Idaho?
Yes.
And the tools and methods that are used to your knowledge are they
also used by the federal bureau of investigation?
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A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:

A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:

Yes.
In fact, you have recently been working a number of cases with the FBI
have you not?
Yes.
And are these tools and methods that you utilize to your knowledge
regularly used by commercial organization is to determine truth or
falsity?
I don't know about that.
All right. But these methods that you used in this case of alleged
embezzlement against Ms. Klinger are the same ones you have used for
the past 37 or so years.
At least 30, yes.
30 all right?
Some of the tools weren't available.
And these methods, these tools, do you describe them in explicit detail
in your police reports that you prepared during an investigation of a
case?
Yes, and if I don't, then the people employ to utilize their tools do.
All right. And you 're aware that all of your reports have previously
been delivered to Mr. Young
Yes.
In fact he's had them for more than a year and a half or so?
Yes.
And again these investigative methods or tools that you utilize to
include or exclude people, why are those necessary? Why do you do
that? What's the purpose of them?
To get to the truth of the matter.

A:
[".]
Q: So in short, the tools and methods you used are standard to include or
exclude individuals accused, are they not?
A:
Yes.
Tr., Vol. 2.13.I7 - 2.21.17, p. 658, L. 22

p. 661, L. 8.

When the testimony ended, the Defendant renewed her objection and moved for
mistrial. The Court denied the motion for the time being but took the matter under
advisement.
After the trial concluded, the District Court denied the Defendant's Motion. It ruled
that the testimony was not polygraph evidence because the term "polygraph" was never
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used. As such, the testimony was ambiguous and could have been referring to a multitude
of potential investigative tools or techniques. The District Court explained:
"First of all, there are a 1ot of techniques that are used in an investigation that can be
-- as pointed out in the redirect, interviews that are not done via a polygraph. There
are techniques that are used that don't involve that type of, I'll use the word
technology. And so I can't find at this point that the redirect was of a nature or
brought about again evidence that was unfairly prejudicial to the defendant or
denying her a fair trial."
Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 -2.21.17, p. 674, L. 4-11.
"During redirect, the term "polygraph" was never used. Again, given the strong
weight of the evidence against her presented at trial, the Defendant is entitled to
neither a mistrial nor a new trial, based upon the State's redirect examination of
Detective Gooch. "

Memorandum, Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Post-Trial Motions, page 15
A. Standard of Review
The Standard of review on motions for mistrial is abuse of discretion and is
reversible error if the appellate court is unable to declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
there was no reasonable possibility that the event complained of contributed to the
conviction. See Appellant's Brief, Issue One.
As with motions for mistrial, the denial or introduction of evidence, over an
objection, i~ reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. If discretion is abused, the
error is reversible unless the court is able to declare, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
there was no reasonable possibility that the denial or admission of the evidence
contributed to the conviction.
This issue is distinct and separate from Appellant's Issue One. The Court's denial
of one issue or the other does not require the denial of the other.
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Permitting The Introduction Of
Inadmissible Polygraph Evidence.
The admissibility of polygraph examination evidence has already been discussed
in Issue One of this brief. The question before the court then is: was the testimony
polygraph examination evidence, without actually using the word "polygraph"? The
appellant argues that is was based upon statements made by the Court and the State, the
context of the questions, and the previous testimony of the witness.
The District Court admitted that "the court allowed the State to make inquiry of
Detective Gooch in order for the jury not to be misled into believing that the State
investigators had done anything illegal by utilizing polygraph examinations as a tool
during their investigation." Memorandum, Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Post-

Trial Motions, page 14. This contradicts its ruling on this matter. If the purpose of
allowing the testimony was to allow the State to present evidence that State "investigators
had done anything illegal by utilizing polygraph examinations" then the testimony was
polygraph evidence, whether the word "polygraph" was used or not.
The Court also stated, however, that preventing the jurors from being misled as to
the legality of investigators actions "was the purpose behind the language in Jury
Instruction 8(A)." Memorandum, Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Post-Trial

Motions, page 14. If this is the purpose of the instruction, and the instruction was
sufficient to cure any harm (as the Court ruled several times), then there should be no
need to allow further inquiry on this matter.
Further, the State admitted, both before and after the testimony, that the testimony
was in direct reference to polygraph examinations. Tr., Vol. 2.13.1 -2.21.17, p. 655-657;
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Tr., Vol. 3.22.17, p. 67, L. 14 - p. 69, L. 10; Vol. 3.22.17, p. 77, Ll. The questions asked
on redirect were very similar to wording of proposed alternative jury instructions 8(b),
drafted by the State, further showing that the purpose of testimony was to reference
polygraph examinations.
The context of the testimony indicates that it was related to polygraph
examinations. This testimony came right after the witness referenced polygraph
examinations on cross-examination. Additionally, the questions asked were about tools
that determine "truth or falsity" and are used to exclude or include potential suspects,
while the answers given refer to "getting to the truth of the matter."
The previous testimony of the witness is also helpful in deciphering whether the
testimony was in reference to polygraph examinations. During the witness' entire
testimony on direct-examination and cross-examination, not once did the witness use the
terms tool or technique except when referencing polygraph examinations.
For these reasons, the Court should find that the testimony on redirect
examination was in reference to polygraph examinations and thus inadmissible. As such,
the District Court's denial of the motion and objection, based upon the testimony not
being polygraph evidence, was an abuse of discretion.
Further, because the testimony was polygraph examination evidence, it was in
violation of the District Court's previous ruling on the issue: "Andforfurther direction,
again, polygraph testing is not to be discussed, not to be presented." Tr., Vol. 2.13.17 2.21.17, p. 624, L. 13-17. As such the evidence is inadmissible on those grounds as well.
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C. The District Court's Abuse of Discretion Is Reversible Error.

In ruling on the motion, the District Court found: "Again, given the strong weight
of the evidence against her presented at trial, the Defendant is entitled to neither a mistrial
nor a new trial, based upon the State's redirect examination of Detective Gooch."

Memorandum, Decision and Order Re: Defendant's Post-Trial Motions, page 15. This is
an incorrect statement of the law. As previously noted, the error is only deemed harmless
if, beyond a reasonable doubt, there was no reasonable possibility that the event
contributed to the conviction. See State v. Morgan, 144 Idaho 861, 863-64, 172 P.3d
1136, 1138-39 (Ct. App. 2007).
The harm caused to the appellant's case has already been addressed in issue one
of this brief. The same harm caused by the admission of polygraph evidence on crossexamination of the witness was also caused by the admission of polygraph evidence on
redirect examination of the witness. Further, the testimony on redirect examination did a
great deal of additional harm.
By overruling the continuing objection and thus allowing the State to inquire into
polygraph evidence during the redirect examination of Det. Gooch, the Court directly
undermined the curative instruction 8(a).

In State v. Perry, the Idaho Court of Appeals found, and the Supreme Court
affirmed, that the instruction given by the district court was insufficient because the
"mitigating effect" of the instruction to disregard evidence "was undermined" when
further reference to the evidence was made. State v. Perry, 144 Idaho 665, 168 P.3d 49
(Ct. App. 2007), affd, 150 Idaho 209,245 P.3d 961 (2010).
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The District Court in this case ruled that there was no fundamental error depriving
the Defendant of her right to a fair trial because, in part, it gave Jury Instruction 8(a).
Similar to the situation in Perry, the testimony on redirect examination undermined
Instruction 8(a), thereby negating the curative effect. In fact, the testimony in this case
goes further in negating the instruction than the testimony did in Perry as the testimony
in this case not only introduced the evidence Instruction 8(a) told the jury to disregard, it
directly contradicted the language of the instruction by attempting to bolster the
acceptance and reliability of polygraph examinations. Based upon the District Court's
own logic, negating the effect of Instruction 8(a) could have potentially contributed to
Ms. Klingner's conviction.
The testimony also attempted to vouch for the credibility of Detective Gooch and
the other government witnesses. By introducing testimony meant to show that reliable for
detennining truth, used by law enforcement to "get to the truth of the matter", etc. the State is
attempting to convince the jury that the investigation excluded and included the correct
suspects, that Det. Gooch's conclusions and testimony should be trusted, and that the
government witness who were eliminated as suspects are trustworthy and did not commit the
crime for which the Defendant is accused.
As this brief has pointed out several times, "[p ]olygraph evidence is inadmissible to
vouch for the credibility of a witness." State v. Perry, 144 Idaho 665, 168 P.3d 49 (Ct.
App. 2007). As such, this evidence should have been inadmissible.
The credibility of Det. Gooch is vital to the State's theory of the case. She is the
lead investigator and is the person who recommended that Ms. Klingner be charged with
the crime. She is the State's key witness. If the jury disbelieves her testimony it is much
more likely to conclude that reasonable doubt exists.
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The credibility of the other Boise County employees is also critical to the State's
case. All but two government witnesses are or were Boise County employees who had
access to the missing money and are potentially responsible for the theft. This is the
central portion of Ms. Klingner's theory of case: that someone other than her is
responsible for the alleged theft. If the jury believes that the government witnesses are
credible because they passed a polygraph, Ms. Klingner's theory of the case is
considerably less compelling.
Further, the testimony caused the Defendant considerable harm as it acted as an
attack on her own credibility. Even if the Defendant chooses not to testify, because there
is no evidence directly tying her to the missing money (outside any interaction she may
have had during the performance of her job), this case comes down to whether the jury
believes her story or the one told by the State. If the jury believes she took and failed a
polygraph, because she was not eliminated as a suspect, then the Defendant's version of
events becomes considerably less credible. Alternatively, if they believe everyone else
that could be responsible passed a polygraph, Ms. Klingner's credibility is harmed in the
same manor.
For the above reasons, m addition to those identified in Issue One, the court
should find that Court's denial of the objection and motion for mistrial was not harmless
and it is reasonably possible that the testimony contributed to Ms. Klingner's conviction.
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III. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Restitution In The Amount
Of $36,376.37.
Reasonableness is the "touchstone" of restitution. State v. Reale, 343 P .3d 49, 55
(Idaho App. 2014). The State has the burden of proving reasonable restitution by a
preponderance of the evidence. State v. Cottrell, 271 P.3d 1243, 1253 (Idaho App. 2012).
"Restitution is not mandatory .. .it may not be ordered in cases where it is unnecessary or
inappropriate." Id. "Restitution shall be ordered for any economic loss which the victim
actually suffers. " Idaho Code § 19-5304(2). Restitution does not include speculative loss
or intended loss and is not used to compensate victims for punitive damages. State v.

Straub, 292 P.3d 273, 278 (Idaho 2013). It is "limited to the economic loss sustained [i.e.
"actually suffered"] by the victim as a result of the offense." Id.

A. Standard Of Review
The District Court held a Restitution Hearing in this case on March 22, 2017. At
this hearing the State submitted one exhibit - An unsworn spreadsheet summarizing
losses supposedly sustained as a result of Ms. Klingner's criminal conduct (marked States
Exhibit 1). No other evidence was presented by the State as to restitution.
Based upon this hearing and the subsequent briefing filed by the parties, the
District Court ordered restitution in the amount requested by the State. In its decision, the
District Court found: "The amount presented into evidence by the State of $36,376.37
accurately reflects the total amount of cash, the total amount indicated on money orders,
and the amount written on the checks or money orders taken by Ms. Klingner on the days
that each were taken. The Court will find that the State has proven the amount of
restitution in the amount of $36,376.37 by a preponderance of the evidence."

Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Defendant's Post-Trial Motions, p. 8.
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B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Restitution When The
State Had Failed To Present Any Evidence.

The facts of this case are very similar to State v. Nelson 390 P.3d 418, 423 (Idaho
2017). There, the only evidence produced by the prosecution as to restitution was a
"Statement of Costs." The "Statement of Costs" was an unsigned, unsworn, statement.
The court ruled that "unsworn oral or written representations, even those of an officer of
the court, are not evidence." State v. Nelson 390 P.3d 418,423 (Idaho 2017). The court
found that because the "Statement of Costs" was not evidence, the district court had
abused its discretion by ordering restitution: "Since the State here failed to present
evidence, there can be no award ofrestitution." Id.
In this case, like the "Statement of Costs" State's Exhibit 1 is an unsigned,
unsworn, statement and is not evidence. As no other evidence was presented, the District
Court abused its discretion in ordering restitution.
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Ms. Klingner To Pay
Restitution To A 3rd Party Insurer Without Proof Of A Contractual Obligation
And Economic Loss Incurred Pursuant To That Contract.

The Defendant concedes that an insurance company can be a classified as a victim
for the purposes of restitution. Idaho Code 19-5304. However, the court can not award
restitution to a 3rd party insurer without sufficient proof: ( 1) Identifying the 3rd party
insurer, (2) showing a contractual relationship between the yd party insurer and a directly
injured party, (3) payments made by the 3rd party insurer in accordance with the
contractual relationship, and (4) any economic loss of the 3rd party insurer resulted from
the criminal conduct. State v. Cheeney, 160 P.3d 451,455 (Idaho App. 2007); LC.§ 19-
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5304(1)(e)(iv). "19-5304(l)(e)(iv) requires evidence of a contractual obligation before
the district court may enter an order of restitution and judgment for a third-party victim
that incurred a loss by making payments to a directly-injured victim." Id. at 297, 160 P.3d
at 454. Without sufficient proof of the contractual obligation, restitution can not be
ordered for the payments made by a third party victim. Id. The State is required to
produce sufficient evidence that any payments were made pursuant to the contractual
obligation and resulted in economic loss due to the criminal conduct. Id.
In State v. Cheeney the court held that the district court had erred "by ordering the
defendant to pay restitution" to a third party when "the state failed to present substantial
evidence that those parties incurred an economic loss pursuant to contracts with [the
victim]." Id.
In this case, the State has failed to provide proof of a contractual obligation
between ICRMP and Boise County or any evidence of economic loss sustained by
ICRMP pursuant to a contract with Boise County. As such the District Court has erred in
ordering the defendant to pay restitution to ICRMP.
D. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Rana Klinger To Pay
Restitution For Unnegotiated Drafts.

The District Court is not required to order restitution for any amount it determines
to be inappropriate or undesirable. LC. § 19-5304(2). The Court may, at its discretion,
order restitution for a partial or nominal amount. See: l.C. § 19-5304(3). This allows the
District Court to determine what is reasonable.
"The primary purpose of restitution in Idaho is remediation." State v. Cottrell, 271
P.3d 1243, 1253 (Idaho App. 2012). "Restitution is not mandatory .. .it may not be
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ordered in cases where it is unnecessary or inappropriate." Id. It must be "restorative" i.e.
based upon a loss or need actually suffered as a result of the offense. Id.
The District Court's order for restitution of unnegotiated checks or money orders
is an abuse of discretion as it is unnecessary and inappropriate. No actual money ever
changed hands. The original issuer of the draft is still in position of the money the draft
was meant to represent.
The State in this case stipulated that none of the checks or money orders missing
from Boise County were ever deposited or cashed by Ms. Klingner. In fact, they were
never cashed or deposited by anyone.
Drafts are nothing more than a document outlining the terms of a yet unfulfilled
obligation. If the draft is lost or destroyed, the drawer is still obligated to pay the debt
represented by the instrument. This means that the drawer of the missing drafts written to
Boise County, still has an outstanding obligation to Boise County and Boise County still
has a legal right to collect.
The District Court's Order for restitution on these unnegotiated drafts is an abuse
of discretion because instead of remediation it has resulted in unjust enrichment. The
individuals who issued the drafts to Boise County have received an unjust windfall based
upon the District Court's Order. They have received products or services from Boise
County but no actual payment was ever made. The money is still in their possession. It
never left their possession. By ordering restitution for these drafts, Court has essentially
required Ms. Klingner to pay for the obligations owed by these individuals.
Additionally, even now, after Ms. Klingner has paid restitution for these
unnegotiated drafts, there is nothing preventing Boise County from also enforcing the
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original obligation. Boise County meets all the qualifications for enforcing instruments
that have been lost, destroyed, or stolen under U.C.C §3-309 and §3-312. The drawers of
the missing drafts have never actually made a payment in satisfaction of the debt. The
road is clear to for Boise County to receive payment from both parties.
For the above reasons, restitution for unnegotiated drafts is inappropriate and
undesirable as it is neither remedial or compensatory. As such the District Court's order
requiring Rana Klingner to pay restitution for these drafts is an abuse of discretion.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, this Court should reverse and remand this case back
to the District Court. Additionally, this Court should reverse the District Court's order for
restitution.
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